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ABSTRACT
Civil disobedience is a widespread form of political protest used by minorities to make their 
voices heard in democratic societies. It is a mechanism of participation in the process of 
shaping public opinion, and of intervention, by via negativa, in the legislative process. In ex-
ercising it, citizens can assert their public autonomy when faced with serious decisions that, 
from their perspective, undermine the values on which society is based. This form of political 
dissidence is thus a highly valuable device in order to revitalize the participatory fundamen-
tals of representative democracy.
Keywords: civil disobedience, representative democracy, political participation, citizenship, 
social change, Arendt, Habermas.
RESUMO
A desobediência civil é uma forma generalizada de protesto político usado pelas minorias 
para fazer ouvir suas vozes em sociedades democráticas. Trata-se de um mecanismo de 
participação no processo de formação da opinião pública e de intervenção, via negativa, no 
processo legislativo. Ao exercê-la, os cidadãos podem afirmar sua autonomia pública diante 
de decisões sérias que, sob sua perspectiva, minam os valores em que a sociedade se ba-
seia. Esta forma de dissidência política é, portanto, um instrumento altamente valioso para 
revitalizar os fundamentos participativos da democracia representativa.
Palavras-chave: desobediência civil, democracia representativa, participação política, cida-
dania, mudança social, Arendt, Habermas.
Responding to the democratic impulse can be seen as an attempt to reduce the distance 
between those who make political decisions and those who are affected by these decisions. Public 
debate about the different options, with arguments for and against freely put forward by every-
one who is affected by and involved in their possible implementation, is necessary to give political 
agreements a genuinely democratic complexion (see Velasco, 2006). In most current democra-
cies, however, those possibly affected by the decisions are neither taken into account nor given a 
voice. When official channels of deliberation and participation are in practice closed off to most 
citizens, it is then that the potentials of civil disobedience become more visible: civil disobedi-
ence presents itself as a means to non-violently channelling the prevailing discontent into the 
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real functioning of democratic systems and, therefore, as an 
instrument to guarantee democratic participation in matters 
of general interest.
Democracy can be characterized as a form of political 
organization that converts the expression of popular will 
into binding regulations for members of society as well as the 
whole of state powers and organs. So that this conversion is 
carried out legitimately, in the complex process of creating 
laws and making decisions, it is necessary to consider not only 
strictly institutional aspects, but also non-institutionalized el-
ements that are conducive to the most direct participation 
of citizens. The realization of the principle of popular sover-
eignty—on which the democratic system is based—requires 
numerous conduits of expression that are much broader than 
those provided by the customary institutional channels of po-
litical representation.
Although the principle of popular sovereignty, insofar as 
it conceives of the citizenry as a legislative power and even a 
constituent power, is closely related to the conception of laws, 
its mere abstract citation does not sufficiently explain the 
genesis and transformation of laws, complex phenomena that 
are not clear from the perspective of the legislative process 
in its institutional dimension, that is, the creation of laws by 
the state. Democracy exists on the basis of suppositions that 
neither institutions nor laws create, but instead only channel. 
Parliament, which embodies ordinary legislative power as an 
organ that represents popular will in constitutional systems, 
is, from the point of view of the normative self-understand-
ing of democracies, the most renowned sounding board in the 
public sphere of society, where the proposals that are after-
wards debated in legislative chambers are actually generated. 
If this is so—and from a regulatory point of view, at least, it 
is—the genesis of opinion-shaping is found in non-institu-
tionalized processes, in different kinds of associations (trade 
unions, churches, discussion forums, neighbours’ associations, 
non-governmental volunteer organizations, etc.) which make 
up civil society, a genuine network of networks (see Cohen 
and Arato, 1992). Therein lies the dynamism of the social 
corps, society’s infrastructure for the shaping of public opin-
ion and the formulation of needs; civil society is the first 
instance of the creation of concrete political proposals and, 
most importantly, for the control of the practical execution of 
constitutional principles.
However, in modern democracies, political parties—
with their bureaucratic structures and under the tight control 
of their highest-ranking leaders—have in practice monopo-
lized these functions, denying citizens the opportunity to de-
fine the election choices and to oversee the execution of their 
programs. From this negative experience arises the conviction 
that we need other forms of citizen participation and alterna-
tives for collective action that do not necessarily pass through 
the filter of conventional hierarchical parties.
Throughout history, small groups of citizens have played 
a decisive role in the expression of the common will. In fact, 
some important changes in mentality have resulted from the 
action of critical minorities mobilized by a determined will to 
influence society. Put another way, “social innovations are fre-
quently advanced by marginal minorities, although afterwards 
they are generalized to the whole of society at an institutional 
level” (Habermas, 1990, p. 129). In modern societies, where 
opinion is directed (and frequently manipulated) by the mass 
media, the criteria of the majority, based on a mere addiction 
to votes, is not always the criteria of normative rightness, nor a 
guarantee that justifies its content in terms of general interest. 
Only some minorities that hold non-conformist stances are 
able to question dominant acritical generalizations at a given 
moment. The protest of a dissident conscience, organized in a 
social movement, is an important point of mobilization that 
can culminate in the creation or reform of a law or in the design 
and implementation of new policies. It is precisely from this 
perspective that it is possible to understand the phenomenon 
of civil disobedience in advanced societies as a touchstone of 
the legitimacy of democratic law.
Until a couple of decades ago, a large part of the Euro-
pean literature on the subject focused on the legal implica-
tions of civil disobedience—in particular, possible determina-
tions of the legal code in response to a violation of one of its 
laws—and the moral suppositions of civil disobedience—in 
close relation to the classic question of the reasons for obeying 
the law. However, and with all due respect for these dimen-
sions, civil disobedience is essentially a type of social action 
with a specific political goal carried out and publicized by an 
organized group of individuals, as highlighted by the North 
American literature that grew out of the activities of the civ-
il rights movement in the 1960s (e.g., Bedau, 1969; Arendt, 
1972). In the meantime, this emphasis on its political aspect 
has become routine, to the extent that civil disobedience has 
come to form part of the contemporary political lexicon.
On the specific political nature 
of civil disobedience
Following the personal example and doctrine of differ-
ent figures like Thoreau, Tolstoy, and Gandhi, throughout 
the last half century there has been a dramatic increase in 
open disobedience to the law in democratic societies, and 
not exactly by selfish delinquents, but by persons inspired by 
venerable ideals such as justice, equality, liberty, peace, and 
environmental conservation. This trend became more com-
mon after the revolutionary hopes associated with socialism 
as an alternative to capitalism were liquidated—a liquidation 
whose greatest emblem is the fall of the Berlin Wall—and 
the consequent abandonment of the most radical forms of 
rebellion and dissidence. Since then, civil disobedience has 
been incorporated as a strategy of direct action by different 
political factions such as the multi-faceted anti-globalization 
movement, defenders of immigrants’ rights, conservative 
groups opposed to the legalization of same-sex marriage, and 
mobilizations denouncing the abuses of banks in mortgage 
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settlements (see Fernández Buey, 2005, p. 8-11). In times 
marked by a profound economic crisis in which numerous 
political regimes evolve towards post-democratic authoritar-
ianism and technocratic governments multiply, while social 
inequality increases, new forms of social resistance appear to 
be vindicated by social movements of a very different profile.
Numerous political scientists, sociologists, philosophers 
of law, and moral philosophers have shown a keen interest 
in the many theoretical and practical questions raised by this 
expressive form of political dissidence. Among the questions 
that capture the attention not only of specialists but also of 
politically conscious citizens, some, like the following, are 
especially relevant: Is the citizen bound to uncritical obedi-
ence to a democratically elected government? Under what 
circumstances can one refuse to obey a government or a law 
created through democratic procedures? Can one as a citi-
zen or member of a minority group embark on acts of civil 
disobedience in order to change the laws to which one the-
oretically consented, or must one wait for the next election 
to express one’s disagreement, given that these laws—again, 
theoretically—constitute the express will of the majority? 
Must a democratic society be tolerant with regard to illegal 
forms of protest? Who is the more exemplary citizen, one 
who complies with everything the established powers dictate 
or one who disobeys whatever contravenes the sense of justice 
proclaimed in constitutional writings? Obviously, it is not this 
paper’s intent to answer such a variety of questions but rather 
only to create a theoretical–practical framework that will al-
lows one to take a reasoned position.
For different individuals or groups that at any given mo-
ment are part of a minority, the exercise of civil disobedience 
represents a way to firmly though peacefully express their dis-
agreements with the opinion of the majority. In totalitarian 
regimes, dissidents do not normally have many opportunities 
to demonstrate without putting their personal integrity at 
risk. Under such circumstances, it might be more appropriate 
to act more radically, and not necessarily respectfully towards 
the authorities and their more-or-less arbitrary regulations. It 
is in democratic societies that civil disobedience is most com-
monly exercised. However, this statement contains a para-
dox: the actors of civil disobedience normally give reasons of 
a moral nature precisely against a system that can assert its 
superiority over any other real form of government in vir-
tue of embracing important elements of the moral discourse 
in question. The democratic process is only recognizable if it 
facilitates the exercise of popular sovereignty—through the 
application of majority rule—and the effective enjoyment of 
human rights. If it is accepted that the democratic procedure 
of decision-making is greatly analogous to the procedure of 
moral discourse, and in that sense the corresponding solu-
tions can be morally justified, it would not seem reasonable to 
call into question the results of this procedure and try to po-
litically justify civil disobedience. However, the contrast with 
the disappointing practice of many real democracies unfortu-
nately renders this type of dissidence much more acceptable.
Civil disobedience is not the only non-institutionalized 
political instrument to express rejection of the decisions of 
the majority and/or the established power. There is at least 
one more radical form of opposition to the law that has a long 
tradition: the right of resistance (see, for example, Kaufmann 
and Backemann, 1972). An important historical precedent 
can be found in 16th-century controversies about the limits of 
the sovereign’s absolute power and the defence of tyrannicide, 
all within a discussion about legitimate domain. Throughout 
the 18th century, the notion of resistance to established power 
rids itself of its feudal burden and can be characterized as rev-
olutionary disobedience, in that it tried to radically subvert 
the reigning status quo, modify the legal code, and change the 
direction of the government. Thus, the right to resist oppres-
sion was proclaimed in the Declaration des Droits de l’Homme 
et du Citoyen of 1789 by erudite philosophers as a guarantee of 
protection of other rights (freedom, property and security). 
There is oppression, which, in the context of this declaration, 
equals bad government when power does not restrict itself to 
the end of all political association, that is, to the guarantee of 
the rights of human beings and citizens. As such, according 
to the same historical context, the right to resist presents a 
peculiar statute:
In legal terms, the right to resist is a sec-
ondary right in the same way as secondary 
norms provide for the protection of prima-
ry norms: it is a secondary right which is 
triggered at a secondary stage when the 
primary rights of liberty, property and se-
curity have been trampled on. The right to 
resist is also different in that it is triggered 
to protect the other rights, but cannot itself 
be protected, and therefore is exercised at 
one’s own risk (Bobbio, 1996, p. 84).
With the notable exception of the Basic Law for the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, references to the right to resist do 
not normally appear in contemporary magnae cartae, as it is 
felt that its recognition implies being outside of the system 
itself, an argument that was defended by Kant with his usu-
al rigor (see Kant, 2007, p. 176-182).2 Another significant 
exception, now in international legal texts, is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations document 
2 In addition to the idea of legal security as an important asset that must be protected, Kant would put forward that, for a people to 
be authorized to resist, there should be a public law that allows for this; but this sort of regulation would be contradictory because the 
sovereign, the moment she allows resistance against herself, renounces her own sovereignty and the subject becomes sovereign in her 
place. This is a contradiction that, in my mind, is not a contradiction if we take seriously the idea of popular sovereignty, that is, that the 
people are the true sovereign.
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that for more than fifty years has established the guidelines 
of the debate and action about human rights on an interna-
tional level (see Hunt, 2007, p. 204-206). The preamble of the 
UDHR states why the document came into being: “Whereas 
it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, 
as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, 
that human rights should be protected by the rule of law”.
Civil disobedience is also different from another form of 
resistance to authority and laws that has been well-received 
in democratic societies, namely conscientious objection. This 
term has come to refer exclusively to a form of recognized—
and, as such, legal— exemption from a general duty (such as 
obligatory military service), which is why it is no longer prop-
erly a form of disobeying the law or non-compliance with 
established authorities. The recognition of conscientious ob-
jection serves as a measure of how flexible a political system is 
in response to individual dissidence, as well as its ability to de-
activate criticism of that dissidence. Conscientious objection 
must be conceived, in principle, as disobedience to the law 
without political purpose, a trait that civil disobedience does 
not share (in the latter the will to modify or reform legislation 
and/or current policies is made explicit). The distinction es-
tablished by Hannah Arendt between one form of dissidence 
and another is valid here: while the conscientious objector 
is driven by the morals of the good human, the person who 
engages in civil disobedience follows the morals of the good 
citizen (Arendt, 1972, p. 58-62). In practice, however, it is dif-
ficult to think that the individual who considers a legal duty 
morally unacceptable does not simultaneously try to change 
current legislation. If her objection is morally grounded, she 
will aspire to its becoming a universal law. It is different, how-
ever, if, based on pragmatism (e.g. after the verification that 
the social majority is far from reconciling its point of view), 
one renounces undertaking political action.
After these observations, a conceptual demarcation of 
civil disobedience can be outlined: its essence lies in the gen-
eral idea of a transgression of politically motivated law exercised 
within the patterns of a democratic culture. That is why a 
definition like the one below is extremely fitting:
‘Civil disobedience’ can be understood as 
an intentionally illegal (as opposed to legal 
forms of protest), principle-based (in con-
trast to ‘ordinary’ crimes or ‘groundless’ dis-
turbances) act of collective protest that pur-
sues the political goal of changing certain 
laws, certain policies or certain institutions 
(in contrast to rejection for reasons of con-
science, which is constitutionally protected 
in some states) (Celikates, 2013, p. 40).
One can deduce from these words that this form of dis-
sidence basically consists of a conscious breakdown of the le-
gal system in place, not so much to seek a personal exemption 
from a general duty shared by all citizens (as would be the 
case with conscientious objection), but instead to replace the 
broken law with another that is supposed to be more in agree-
ment with general interests. However, these are interests that 
must be identified through a democratic procedure of devel-
oping informed opinion.
Habermas and the legitimacy  
of civil disobedience
Until now we have highlighted two important compo-
nents of the meaning of civil disobedience, namely a break 
from current law and its political purpose. However, in our 
times, the term is an object of constant use and abuse that 
cannot be clarified by merely resorting to these two notes. For 
its ambiguous and sometimes incoherent use, the following 
explanation can be given:
The second word of the expression—dis-
obedience—is intuitively clear to everyone 
or almost everyone who writes or pro-
nounces it, but the first—civil—is ambig-
uous, polysemous. From this ambiguity 
about what must be understood by ‘civil’ 
originate many of the controversies about 
the foundation of and justification for civil 
disobedience at this time (Fernández Buey, 
2005, p. 13).
In this section of the article, we will try to clarify the 
meaning of the term “civil” with the help of the theoretical 
and conceptual resources that the work of Jürgen Habermas 
provides. The question of obedience to the law in general, and 
civil disobedience in particular, is closely related to a position 
that is held about the foundations of legitimacy of power 
from which the binding regulations for all persons emanate. 
And at the same time, the answer to this question depends 
on the treatment given to the use of violence in social rela-
tions. For these two reasons alone, reference to Habermas is 
indispensable. As put forth below, Habermas explores the po-
tentialities of civil disobedience in political practice, without 
forgetting to analyse the conditions of its moral admissibility 
and, in short, of its legitimacy.
Between speech and policy there is a close link, as Ar-
istotle warned in offering us two complementary definitions 
of the human being: as an animal with the ability to speak 
and as a political animal (see Arendt, 1973, p. 9). The prefer-
ence given to speech as an alternative to violence for resolving 
matters that affect the whole community is part of politics. 
This idea is closely related to the deliberative political mod-
el that Habermas defends (see Velasco, 2013, p. 138-182), a 
model that nonetheless cannot avoid the existence of forms 
of political intervention that, without ceasing to use speech, 
become action: “A well-considered theory of political deliber-
ation cannot rely on the power of reason alone and needs to 
explore when protest is justified, in what form, and how it can 
be integrated into a rational dialogue” (Parekh, 2000, p. 306).
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Normative considerations of the proliferation of protest 
actions—against the law and sometimes testing the accept-
able limit of violence—cannot be disconnected, according to 
Habermas, from the phenomenon of structural violence that 
is inseparable from political life. In the daily functioning of 
political systems, even in those that are democratic, there is a 
constant intertwining of power and violence, a common situ-
ation that prevents the free communicative action of coercion 
from being a real option:
In political institutions—and not only in 
them—there is structural violence involved. 
Structural violence does not manifest itself 
as violence, but instead, surreptitiously 
blocks communications in which convictions 
generated from legitimacy are formed and 
propagate (Habermas, 1987b, p. 246).3
This is why all political effort that seeks to render the 
project of recomposing public space as a viable stage for dem-
ocratic politics must unabashedly assume the intrinsic ambi-
guity of power. A liberating social practice cannot totally ex-
clude the use of a calculated form of symbolic violence (in any 
case, directed against things and never against persons), even 
at the risk of being qualified by the established power as mere 
violence. Although in pluralist democracies the recognition of 
formal equality includes widespread access to public debates, 
that right cannot be exercised in practice immediately, as “the 
social system is one of domination, and the dominating par-
ty cannot be brought to listen to an argument or accept any 
kind of reciprocity unless it is forced to pay attention” (Heller, 
1982, p. 27). Beyond the possible relevance of this observation 
made by Agnes Heller in a tone of reproach against Haber-
mas, the fact is that, not long afterwards, Habermas would 
approach the question of civil disobedience as a valid instru-
ment in the process of the radical-democratic shaping of po-
litical opinion, in the most genuinely republican tradition. In 
some of his most spirited essays, Habermas sustains that civil 
disobedience represents, in short, a normal and necessary el-
ement of democratic culture, an instrument for achieving the 
goals of democratic rule of law and for assuring the effective-
ness of constitutional values and rights, that is, a vehicle for 
the maturation of public opinion and real political participa-
tion on the part of citizens.
The only two works by Habermas devoted explicitly to 
the subject of civil disobedience date back to the first half of 
the 1980s, and are entitled “Civil Disobedience: Touchstone 
of the Democratic Rule of Law”which the author previ-
ously presented at a symposium organized by the German 
Social Democratic Party, and which was published in Sep-
tember 1983and “Law and Violence: A German Trauma,” 
published in January 1984.4 These public appearances by 
Habermas connected his own interest in critically rethinking 
the regulatory basis for democratic parliamentary systems. In 
addressing the matter of civil disobedience, Habermas is to a 
great extent indebted to some North American liberal-dem-
ocratic theories, as he himself explicitly recognizes. In com-
plete agreement with John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Pe-
ter Singer, he conceives of civil disobedience as the execution 
of non-violent action against current laws carried out to di-
rectly influence public opinion—on which it exercises moral 
pressure—and in this way succeed in modifying certain laws 
or government decisions.5 She who breaks the law, in addition 
to being motivated by political-moral reasons, must not reject 
the rest of the legal code and must accept the penal conse-
quences of her actions. In this way, civil disobedience can be 
characterized as the right to symbolic resistance:
The concept implies a symbolic breaking of 
the law as a last means of appealing to the 
majority so that, in matters of principles, it 
might again reflect upon on its decisions, 
and if possible, revise them. This conse-
quently assumes that one is in a rule of law, 
and also a psychological identification of 
whoever breaks the law with the legal sys-
tem in place, considered in its entirety. Only 
then can he or she justify their protest by re-
sorting to the same constitutional principles 
the majority resorts to in order to be consid-
ered legitimate (Habermas, 1990, p. 95-96).
Insofar as anyone who exercises it abides by these requi-
sites, civil disobedience will move in an uncertain threshold 
located between the rejected legality and the demanded le-
gitimacy. Although presumably a democratic state should not 
only consider those who perpetrate these acts as radically dif-
ferent from common criminals but should even grant them a 
certain public recognition, given that their attitude denotes 
a radical civic commitment, with the aim of conserving the 
aforementioned tension, neither criminalization nor legaliza-
tion would be adequate responses, according to Habermas.
3 Arendt and Habermas share concerns such as the effort to restore the dynamism of public space, critique of the functionalism of the 
social sciences, and the will to acknowledge the importance of political activity. Habermas (1987b) has carefully read Arendt’s work, 
whose influence is decisive in his conception of public opinion and his idea of communicative power. For affinities and dissimilarities 
between these two authors, see Roman (1987, p. 161-181); Ferry (1987, p. 75-115); and Benhabib (1995, p. 96-130).
4 These two articles make up the section titled “Autumn 1983 or The Moral Neutralization of Law” of Habermas’s book Die Neue 
Ünübersichtlichkeit (Habermas, 1985, p. 51-89). On the socio-historical context in which Habermas develops this position, see Specter 
(2010, Ch. 4).
5 Specifically, Habermas adopts the definition of the dissident phenomenon proposed by John Rawls quite literally (Habermas, 1985, 
p. 83-84). Rawls’s definition, which in turn explicitly follows Bedau (1961), states: “a public, non-violent, conscientious yet political act 
contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” (Rawls, 1971, p. 363).
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The appeal to what John Rawls calls the “sense of jus-
tice” of the majority of society is a constituent element of civil 
disobedience. It is not a plea to a vague or abstract idea, as 
this sense of justice is typically formulated in the fundamental 
laws of the state. For this reason, political dissidence in the 
mode of civil disobedience has its rightful place in a demo-
cratic state as long as a minimum constitutional loyalty or 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the system is maintained, fun-
damentally expressed in the essentially symbolic—and hence 
peaceful—nature of protest. The occasional infringement of 
certain binding regulations then acquires a strategic sense: a 
calculated act to raise public awareness of the mistake of cer-
tain legal or administrative decisions or of the need to take 
new steps to adapt current constitutional principles to chang-
ing social circumstances. The sphere of action of civil disobe-
dience is defined and demarcated by these assumptions.
On the basis of these ideas, Habermas analyses some po-
litical demonstrations that could be classified as non-conven-
tional democratic practice. The big pacifist demonstrations 
in the autumn of 1983 and protests against the installation 
of Euromissiles (nuclear ballistic missiles Pershing II deployed 
by NATO in the strategic context of the Cold War) fuelled 
an important political-moral debate that split German public 
opinion. The mass protests, which included violations of ad-
ministrative laws (for example, the blocking of public streets), 
were justified as civil disobedience. In the midst of that de-
bate, Habermas expressed his conviction that civil disobe-
dience was the most reliable indicator of the maturity of a 
democratic political culture. This morally motivated disobe-
dience represents the last guardian of the legitimacy of the 
democratic rule of law, a legitimacy not measurable without 
further considerations on the basis of the exclusively proce-
dural calculation of parliamentary majority rule. Apart from 
denouncing the attempt to make the will of Parliament pre-
vail over the will of the majority of citizens as reflected in the 
polls, in the aforementioned pacifist campaign, the structural 
limits of the mechanisms of the representative state were ex-
posed in facing a problem that went beyond the traditional 
spheres of recognizing decisions. Along the same line, Claus 
Offe and other authors recall the aporias and ambiguities that 
purely demoscopic methods of shaping opinion involve. The 
moral legitimacy of these methods is especially dubious when 
they concern decisions weighted with irreversible future sig-
nificance. Because of this, they defend the limitation of the 
principle of majority through the subjection of the criteria 
and conditions of its application to a decision in turn made 
by a majority.6
The inability to understand the reasons given by dissi-
dents can produce some undesired consequences, as the rea-
sonable limits of civil disobedience are easily stretched, always 
at the risk of its actors silencing its peaceful democratic con-
dition. As a consequence, it was necessary to evaluate the 
landmark that its mass practice signified in German political 
and legal culture, in the sense that it implied a rupture with 
political abstentionism, with citizens’ disinterest in public af-
fairs, since all in all it constituted a way of actively participat-
ing in the creation of a radically democratic political opinion. 
However, there were those (in the German case, important 
authorities like the President, the government, and the Con-
stitutional Court) who sustained that any form of resistance 
to the law, even if non-violent, is not only punishable but also 
morally reprehensible. This vision of things entails a danger-
ous blindness, as “there is only one step between scorning the 
political-moral motivations of one who breaks the law and 
isolating that person, discrediting them as an enemy” (Haber-
mas, 1985, p. 102). On the psychosocial level, Habermas 
identifies this mistrust of civil disobedience as a symptom of 
what has been called the German Trauma, a trauma that, on 
a more theoretical level, would answer to what he himself 
called German Hobbesianism, a doctrinal position close to 
the authoritarian legalism adopted by many jurists and which 
Habermas sees personified in Josef Isensee. For this author, 
civil disobedience to the rule of law is a perversion of an un-
acceptable right to resist, since the monopoly of force and the 
assurance of peace constitute the foundation of the modern 
state, and that goal is impossible if it is the citizen who decides 
for herself when justified resistance will occur.
The challenge of Hobbesianism is one of the theoretical 
centres of the Habermasian defence of civil disobedience. On 
the occasion of the English translation of some of the early 
writings of Carl Schmitt, Habermas wrote an article against the 
recent uncritical reception of this author’s thought, and by way 
of this reception, the thought of Thomas Hobbes (see Haber-
mas, 1987a, p. 103-114; a most detailed study of this topic can 
be found in Maus, 1976). This kind of Hobbesianism entails 
accepting the pre-eminence of formal legality and legal securi-
ty, entrenched as superior assets, over the legitimacy of the sys-
tem. Put this way, any form of resistance to the law, as justified 
as it may seem, destroys the legality of the legal code, which, 
following Hobbes, “is only supported in the state monopoly of 
force and does not require any recognition in view of appropri-
ate content.” The line of argument put forward leaves no doubt 
about the authoritarian nature of the solution adopted: “Only 
a State that monopolizes force can prevent the great evil, that 
is, civil war” and, consequently, “matters of legitimation must be 
subordinated without reservations to the problem of guaran-
teeing legality” (Habermas, 1985, p. 108-109). This thesis leads 
not only to relativizing the matter of legitimacy, but also to its 
practical cancellation. Applied to the subject of civil disobedi-
ence, it is wrong from the beginning, upon getting the meaning 
of the problem wrong. Not all dissidence can be assessed as an 
act of violence: at question is not the possible right to resist a 
radically unjust government but instead the practice of a form 
of partial dissidence in rule of law.
6 The authors agree for the most part on Tocqueville’s preoccupation with stopping the “tyrannical effects of the omnipotence of the 
majority”, the characteristic evil of democratic systems (see Tocqueville, 1981, vol. I, p. 343-360).
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The Habermasian position on civil disobedience tries first 
of all to consider the problem within the question of adherence 
to democratic and social rule of law and, second, to distinguish 
it from violent resistance and all connotations of the classical 
right to resist oppression. However, if it is appropriate to speak 
of civil disobedience only in the context of the rule of law, it 
will be necessary to remember that “from a normative point 
of view, democratic rule of law is made up of two ideas in equal 
measure: a State guarantee of domestic peace and legal security 
for all citizens, and the aspiration that the government order 
is recognized as legitimate by its citizens, that is, freely and by 
conviction” (Habermas, 1985, p. 110). This immanent—and 
consequently, postmetaphysical—foundation of positive law 
allows us to openly pose the question of its legitimacy, which is 
not reduced to the mere formal correction of its rules:
The legitimacy of democratic rule of law is 
not satisfied by the simple fact that laws, 
sentences or measures are dictated, pro-
nounced or adopted according to pre-
scribed procedure. On fundamental points, 
procedural legitimacy is not enough: the 
procedure itself and the whole of the legal 
code must be justified on the merit of prin-
ciples (Habermas, 1985, p. 111).
There is, then, no unconditional obedience to positive law: 
not all laws deserve to be obeyed. Only those that present 
material adaptation to constitutional principles can hope for 
qualified obedience from citizens, an obedience that as such al-
lows for the possibility of disobedience. The examination of 
this adaptation is precisely what distinguishes that qualified 
disobedience. The minority gives its conditional consent to 
the decision of the majority only if it is adopted in a public 
forum of open debate and can be revised.
Owing, most likely, to the harsh criticism that German 
legal circles uttered against this position, Habermas is careful 
when justifying civil disobedience. He insists that this form 
of political discrepancy requires the respect of one important 
condition: it must never be exercised outside the context of 
the Constitution. As such, Habermas does not defend a revo-
lutionary use of civil disobedience, as was done in the student 
movements of the 1960s (and whose terrorist offshoots he 
sweepingly condemned). He recognizes the legitimacy of its 
exercise if it is used through calculated strikes that are merely 
symbolic in nature, with the explicit intention of appealing to 
the legal sensitivity of the majority, and especially to its capaci-
ty to understand and its sense of justice. At any rate, they are 
actions exercised by loyal citizens who practice non-violent 
resistance, admissible only with acceptance from the legal and 
political system:
A democratic Constitution even tolerates 
the resistance of dissidents who, after ex-
hausting all legal channels, fight some res-
olution or sentence that nonetheless has 
been legitimately adopted, although on the 
condition that this resistance that infringes 
on laws is justified in a plausible manner on 
the basis of the spirit and the letter of the 
Constitution and it is conducted with means 
that lend the air of a non-violent call to the 
majority so that they think about their de-
cision once more (Habermas, 2004, p. 30, 
emphasis mine).
In his 1992 book Between Facts and Norms, in which he 
summarizes his legal-political theory, Habermas even adds 
some little nuances—as in the paragraph quoted above—to 
his conception of civil disobedience, with the aim of settling 
it even more firmly in the “ground of the Constitution.” He 
insists on defining civil disobedience in constitutional terms: 
“These acts of peaceful and symbolic violation of laws are un-
derstood as an expression of protest against binding decisions 
that, according to the conception of the actors, are, despite 
their legal processing, illegitimate in view of current constitu-
tional principles” (Habermas, 1992, p. 462). Consider as well 
that the strategy of legal and political coverage of civil disobe-
dience based on the reference to the spirit of the principles 
and values recognized in the Constitution would be strength-
ened if “a dynamic understanding of the Constitution as an 
unfinished project” were adopted, that is, a non-essentialist 
conception of the same (Habermas, 1992, p. 464). “From this 
long-term perspective,” Habermas continues in the same text, 
“democratic rule of law is represented not as a completed im-
age, but rather as an undertaking that is sensitive (worn out), 
irritable, above all fallible and in need of revision.”
The Constitution of a democratic state is always an 
“open work,” something that can and must evolve, for in or-
der to maintain its effectiveness as a legal-political framework 
for coexistence, it needs to constantly adapt to the changing 
situation of social reality. It is, like any other human work, re-
visable, and as such modifiable, not through unilateral means, 
but instead through a new consensus that renews the initial 
agreement on which the current text is based. It is not merely 
a “historical document;” it is a plan conceived by a just so-
ciety to outline a political “horizon of expectations,” and the 
members of this just society, through their different interpre-
tations, must be able to adapt it to changing historical circum-
stances. In addition to being citizens of current laws, citizens 
form themselves as qualified constitutional interpreters. In 
this sense, and going one step further, practitioners of civil 
disobedience could be considered active collaborators with 
the constitutional system that they defend whenever laws, 
government decisions, or jurisdictional rulings challenge the 
meaning of constitutional mandates. This idea is reconcilable 
with recognition of the Constitutional Court as the highest 
judicial interpreter, but that does not mean it is the only in-
terpreter of the supreme law (see Rawls, 1993, p. 231-240), 
as constitutional interpretation in its broadest meaning is not 
an activity limited to the narrow and closed circle of jurists, 
but a process open to the participation of all citizens, the last 
repository of sovereignty.
Juan Carlos Velasco
Filosofia Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 17(2): 111-120, may/aug 2016 118
Civil disobedience and 
responsibility for democracy
Considering civil disobedience a form of behaviour closely 
linked to moral convictions has almost become a cliché. Un-
doubtedly, the subjection or rejection of an order of political 
domination in general and of a law in particular is a decision 
that only the individual in the solitude of her conscience can 
make. But the fact that protagonists of this strategic form of col-
lective action do not appeal simply to their moral conscience 
in the exposition of reasons, but to recognized principles in the 
legal code, with special reference to the constitutional text, is 
overlooked. More than an objection for reasons of conscience 
(in which case, moreover, the evidence would have to be more 
complete, better defended, and more rigorous if it were not 
possible to put forward subjectively shared reasons), it is a clear 
exercise of public autonomy, that is, of putting into practice the 
citizen’s capacity for self-determination. The citizen is not only 
the passive recipient of laws and government decisions, but also 
an active author in legislative processes and decision-making. 
Specifically, in opposing certain laws or governmental measures 
through actions of civil disobedience, citizens actively take part 
in the public life of society.
In spite of everything, one wonders whether the actions 
that fall under the category of civil disobedience really seek 
effective results or only try to have a moral or testimonial 
value. Borrowing a term from Max Weber, the question is 
whether civil disobedience represents a manifestation of the 
ethics of conviction or instead the ethics of responsibility (see 
Weber, 1991, p. 120-121). If it were merely a case of acting in 
good conscience, as some wish to say, it would have to be in-
cluded in the first ethical form. Through their actions of pro-
test against social injustices, those who exercise civil disobe-
dience would then seek to keep the “flame of pure intentions” 
burning. However, wanting to identify them as dogmatic fol-
lowers of an ethic of conviction, that is, as “moral solipsists” 
concerned only with “saving their soul without regard for the 
consequences of their actions,” is a false image that has been 
created by the academic literature (see Estévez Araujo, 1994, 
p. 31, note 60).
Agents of civil disobedience normally cite universal 
principles that serve as a normative framework for democ-
racy, principles that are incorporated into modern constitu-
tional law, like respect for the dignity of the person, justice, 
freedom, equality, solidarity, the search for peace, or political 
participation. In fact, in the justifying arguments put forward 
by those who civilly disobey, reasons of a moral, legal, and po-
litical nature intertwine. Those who act as such are convinced 
of the relative uselessness of the legal procedures available, be 
it because of their unbearable slowness or their proven lack of 
effectiveness. The dissident seeks other ways of participation 
different from conventional forms, which does not relegate 
her to the position of a passive subject. She is not an anti-dem-
ocrat, either, but rather a radical democrat.
Although civil disobedience is, at least from the per-
spective of its protagonists, certainly a way of refusing to col-
laborate with injustice, they themselves normally demand 
something else: the construction of a more just world. If they 
accept the legal punishment that results from their actions, it 
is so that it serves as a salutary lesson. Their actions are not 
only public, but are normally explicit attempts to capture 
public attention. They also have the foreseeable consequenc-
es of the action in mind (the increase in repressive reactions 
among them), but never abandon their clear calling of legal 
reform or even social change.
Neither is it in keeping with recorded experience to 
sustain, as the aforementioned literature usually does, that 
disobedient citizens in general accept the system of dem-
ocratic legitimacy as the most correct for the adoption of 
collective decisions. Convictions of that sort can be very 
different. The appeal to publicly accepted principles, such 
as constitutional principles, has an evident component of 
strategic calculation. It would fit the facts more to point out 
that, given that, in reality, that meaning of justice made its 
own by the majority comes loaded with prejudices and has 
been shown to be immune to criticism. What disobedient 
citizens strive for is to rectify this distorted meaning of jus-
tice that has given rise to opposition (see Celikates, 2013, 
p. 38-39). As a consequence, it is extremely curious—if not 
cynical—that politicians with power and jurists with a posi-
tivist background even morally condemn protesters for us-
ing these legally unjustifiable means.
Something else on which Arendt, Rawls, Dworkin, Sing-
er, and Habermas coincide is in remarking that respect for 
the current political system is essential in order for an act 
of political dissidence to be considered civil disobedience, as 
long as the system corresponds to a democratic Constitution. 
However, this trust in government decision-making mecha-
nisms (and in the execution of the same) within a political 
form of representative democracy is not so certain, and the 
emergence of new social movements is proof enough of this 
mistrust. The current situation of civil disobedience cannot 
be separated from the crisis of representative democratic sys-
tems. Its practice must be understood as a more or less partial 
criticism of traditional representative procedures, but a criti-
cism in radical democratic code.
Public initiatives by citizens are increasingly undertaken 
through non-traditional political options. Political action in 
advanced democracies is often carried out via channels other 
than those offered by political parties or trade unions. Social 
protest movements of a broad thematic spectrum or non-gov-
ernmental volunteer organizations are in many cases consid-
ered by many to be preferable options (see Offe, 1985; Riech-
mann and Fernández Buey, 1994). In this sense, and given its 
well-known transnational reach, the impact achieved by the 
anti-globalization movement, varied in its demonstrations 
and not without its internal contradictions, is noteworthy. 
It has managed to present to public opinion—paradoxically, 
ever more global—demands for another form of globalization 
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(for which reason the movement should be called alter-global-
ization): one that attends to, or at least addresses, the needs of 
the poorest of the poor, the environment, and the extension 
of democracy and human rights. The importance of its work 
has not gone unnoticed:
The sub-agents and networks of cooper-
ation that are not tied to territories and 
national priorities are in fact those that in 
recent decades have placed the problems 
of ecological survival, equality between 
women and men, peace and, of course, the 
financial crisis on the political agenda (Beck, 
2013, p. 80).
The non-conventional participatory actions mentioned 
in the paragraph above are no doubt a good reflection of the 
dissatisfaction with the democratic flaws of the party-repre-
sentation system that so many political scientists have studied 
over the past century. If the discontent continues and it is not 
desirable to remain inactive in the face of the inexistence of 
realistic global alternatives, it would be most appropriate to 
correct some of the malfunctions observed in representative 
democracy, or at least complement them with other formu-
lashence the search for new models of citizen participation 
that do not necessarily pass through the bureaucratized sieve 
of political parties and which have a bearing on political pro-
cesses that shape public opinion and decision-making.
An adequate interpretation of civil disobedience would 
be to consider it a complement of the democracy necessary 
for the creation and maintenance of a participatory political 
culture. The development of democracy is viable only if the 
sometimes conflictive but always enriching emergence of dis-
sidence is allowed. Minorities in a democracy do not have to 
renounce their convictions, but they must avoid any impo-
sition that goes beyond the symbolic coercion of the better 
argument. The majority can exercise both legislative omnipo-
tence and unbearable moral pressure on the whole of society, 
eventually breaking any opinion in disagreement. But given 
that there is no indissoluble and necessary union between the 
majority and normative rightness, the decision of the major-
ity must always be revisable in light of the best arguments. 
If democracy entails a cooperative effort in reaching agree-
ments, it is essential for there to be differing, even contrasting 
opinions so that a rational opinion can arise from the process. 
Dissent is, as such, as vital as consensus. Dissidence as such has 
a creative function with a meaning of its own in the political 
process, and in this context, civil disobedience can come to be 
an indispensable instrument.
Given the oligopolic nature of the public-opinion media, 
citizen-led movements do not easily find avenues through 
which their messages can be transmitted to the rest of the 
population and be included on the political agenda. To over-
come these obstacles, the breaking of a law with the specific 
purpose of generating the most open debate possible about its 
justice, its constitutionality, or simply its timeliness could be 
a legitimate possibility. This provocative nature that disobe-
dience preserves makes it an ideal way to shake up the pub-
lic, contributing to an increase in the public debate of ideas. 
In order to continue to expand the participatory element of 
representative democracy, the new emerging political culture 
demands a greater assessment of political dissidence. For all 
of these reasons, civil disobedience deserves to be taken se-
riously.
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